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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of corporate acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover 
of family firms in Continental Europe. We find that CEOs in family firms do not experience an 
increase in their compensation during the post-acquisition period, while there is a positive and 
statistically significant association between the compensation of CEOs in non-family firms and their 
acquisition activity. This finding is consistent with the view that controlling family shareholders 
provide monitoring for CEOs mitigating managerial agency problems that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control. Further, we find that the likelihood of CEO turnover declines following an 
acquisition in non-family firms, suggesting that these acquiring CEOs do not face a higher likelihood 
of dismissal while they receive a higher level of compensation. In contrast, there is no significant 
impact of acquisitions on CEO turnover in family firms.   
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Family firms have been prevalent across the globe, and a growing literature highlights 
differences between family and non-family firms in terms of corporate policy decisions 
(Bennedsen et al., 2010). Empirical evidence shows that family firms differ from non-family 
firms in various ways including their disclosure, financial structure, and acquisition decisions 
(Ali et al., 2007; Caprio et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014). These differences are interpreted as 
mainly arising from distinctive agency issues related to family firms. On the one hand, firms 
with concentrated family share ownership can mitigate managerial agency problems arising 
from the separation of ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Controlling 
family shareholders, whose interests are well aligned with the interests of outside investors, 
are expected to monitor management effectively to reduce potential managerial agency costs. 
On the other hand, controlling family shareholders can make some corporate decisions that 
might allow them to extract private benefits of control at the expense of small shareholders 
(e.g., Bertrand et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000). Further, family firms are known to take a 
long-term management approach in their corporate decision-making (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2011).1 
 In this paper we aim to advance our understanding of corporate acquisition decisions 
in family firms by examining how corporate acquisitions influence CEO compensation and 
CEO turnover in family firms. The current literature suggests that corporate acquisitions can 
be driven by managerial interests, which can come in the forms of enlarged compensation 
packages and reduced risk of CEO turnover following an acquisition (e.g., Jensen, 1986; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). There has been some evidence from US and UK firms that bidder 
                                                          
1 Family firms consider their socioemotional wealth, i.e., the utility they derive from noneconomic aspects of the 
business, including the preservation of the family dynasty and the conservation of the family’s social capital, 
when they make corporate decisions.  
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CEOs receive substantial increases in their compensation during the post-acquisition period, 
while shareholders can experience a decline in their wealth.2 Further, Yim (2013) reports that 
acquisitions also provide US CEOs with an opportunity to lower their risk of replacement. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that has investigated the impact of 
acquisition activity on CEO compensation and CEO turnover in family firms.  Thus, we aim 
to fill this gap in the literature.  
If controlling family shareholders play a vigilant monitoring role, then we should not 
observe acquisitions that are mainly driven by CEOs’ personal interests rather than the 
interests of other shareholders. Thus, in family firms, CEOs may not be able to use 
acquisitions as a way of promoting their self-interest by increasing their compensation and 
reducing their likelihood of replacement, while shareholders experience a loss in their wealth 
during the post-acquisition period. However, if controlling family shareholders do not provide 
monitoring, then CEOs in family firms, in particular professional CEOs, can pursue 
acquisitions as a way of increasing their compensation packages while also gaining greater 
job security. Controlling family shareholders would be expected to have the goal of 
transferring their firms to future generations, suggesting that they might have non-pecuniary 
benefits from their firms’ performance (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Therefore, we can 
argue that family shareholders provide monitoring for CEOs in family firms. We would 
expect families to have the necessary knowledge and incentives for effective monitoring.3 
However, CEOs in non-family firms, where agency problems from a separation of ownership 
and control prevail, can pursue acquisitions for their private benefit in the forms of larger 
                                                          
2 See Bliss and Rosen (2001), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Harford and Li (2007), and Ozkan (2012).  
3 “Four lessons firms can learn from family businesses”, Christian Stadler, Forbes, April 30, 2015; “The family 
way”, Special Report: Family Companies, The Economist, April 18, 2015. 
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compensation packages and lower risk of replacement, which might not necessarily benefit 
shareholders.  
We focus on the following questions: Is the practice of offering a large compensation 
following an acquisition common in family firms? To what extent do controlling family 
shareholders, who are prevalent in Continental European firms, provide monitoring for CEO 
compensation and CEO turnover decisions during post-acquisition? Do family CEOs and 
professional CEOs in family firms differ in the way they are rewarded following acquisitions? 
Despite the recent increase in the acquisition activity in Continental Europe, there has been no 
empirical evidence regarding how acquisitions influence CEO compensation and CEO 
turnover in family and non-family firms. Acquisitions provide an ideal setting for 
investigating the implications of incentives for CEOs in family firms versus non-family firms. 
Prior studies show that acquisitions mostly destroy shareholder wealth in Europe (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2011; Gregory and O'Donohoe, 2014). It is therefore important to explore 
whether CEOs receive an increase in their compensation or/and gain greater job security 
during the post-acquisition period and the extent of acquisitions made by CEOs in family and 
non-family firms to increase CEOs’ personal benefits at the expense of other shareholders. 
For our empirical analysis, we use a sample of 3,219 firm-year observations of 760 
Continental European non-financial firms for which CEO compensation data are available 
from BoardEx over the period of 2001-2008. In our empirical analysis, we control for firm-
specific and board-specific characteristics that are found to influence CEO compensation in 
prior studies. We find that acquisitions have a positive and significant effect on the level of 
CEO total and cash compensation during the post-acquisition period. When we classify our 
sample of firms into family and non-family firms, we find that CEOs in non-family firms 
receive an increase in their compensation following an acquisition, while there is no 
significant relationship between CEO compensation in family firms and their acquisition 
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activity. This finding suggests that CEOs in non-family firms in Continental Europe would be 
motivated to engage in acquisitions as a way of increasing their compensation.  Overall, the 
increasing trend of acquisitions in Continental Europe can be partly explained by the self-
interested pursuits of CEOs in non-family firms.  Further, when we classify our sample of 
family firms into those with family CEOs and those with professional CEOs, our results show 
that professional CEOs in acquiring family firms receive an increase in total and cash 
compensation, while family CEOs do not seem to experience an increase in their 
compensation during the year following an acquisition. Thus, we observe significant 
differences in the way family firms compensate their family and professional CEOs following 
an acquisition. Moreover, we show that acquiring CEOs in non-family firms have a lower 
likelihood of turnover during the post-acquisition period than non-acquiring CEOs.  Thus, 
acquiring CEOs’ expanded compensation packages are not offset by a higher risk of 
termination in non-family firms. We do not observe a similar pattern in family firms, i.e., 
acquisitions by family firms do not have a significant impact on CEO turnover during the 
post-acquisition period. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends the literature 
on the relationship between CEO compensation and acquisition activity by examining how 
acquisitions influence CEO compensation in family firms. Specifically, we show that family 
firms determine their CEO compensation packages following acquisitions differently from 
non-family firms in ways consistent with agency problems associated with separation of 
ownership and control. Second, our paper helps us advance our understanding on the extent to 
which family CEOs could differ from professional CEOs in family firms in terms of their 
motivations for engaging in acquisitions. We show that acquisitions do not have a significant 
impact on family CEOs’ compensation, controlling for other economic determinants of CEO 
compensation. In contrast, professional CEOs in family firms receive larger compensation 
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following acquisitions. Third, we provide evidence on how acquisitions can influence CEO 
turnover during the post-acquisition period in family firms and non-family firms. Specifically, 
we show that there is a significant reduction in the likelihood of CEO replacement in non-
family firms following acquisitions, while acquisitions do not influence the likelihood of CEO 
replacement in family firms. To our knowledge, this is the first study on how acquisitions 
influence CEO compensation and CEO turnover in family firms. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the extant 
literature on corporate acquisitions and CEO compensation and turnover, and describes our 
research questions. Section 3 reports the data characteristics and discusses the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 documents the sample characteristics, and Section 5 presents the 
estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and research questions 
2.1. Corporate acquisitions and family firms in Europe 
A distinctive characteristic of European firms, in comparison to US firms, is that 
family control is considerably dominant in Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Croci et al., 
2012). Previous studies show that family firms are less likely to make acquisitions, controlling 
for all other relevant factors (Caprio et al., 2011; Shim and Okamuro, 2011). Caprio et al. 
(2011) find that Continental European family firms are particularly reluctant to make 
acquisitions when the stake held by the family is not large enough to guarantee control after 
the transaction. Shim and Okamuro (2011) reach a similar conclusion for 244 mergers of 
family and non-family firms in Japan. They find that being a family firm decreases the 
probability of joining in a merger, except in the case that families can maintain their 
controlling shareholder status following a merger. 
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The literature also provides evidence on acquirers’ performance in family and non-
family firms. Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) find that family firms among S&P 500 firms 
are associated with a lower announcement return relative to non-family firms. They also find 
that family firms make relatively poor investment decisions, leading to an average reduction 
of 0.74% in firm value for each acquisition. In contrast, Basu et al. (2009) examine 103 
mergers of newly public US firms and find that acquirers with high levels of family 
ownership outperform acquirers with low or zero levels of family ownership. Bouzgarrou and 
Navatte (2013) find higher acquisition announcement returns for French family acquirers 
relative to non-family acquirers. Furthermore, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) provide evidence 
that lower acquisition performance of French family firms belongs to those managed by 
founders or their heirs. Caprio et al. (2011) find that family control does not influence 
acquisition performance for their sample of Continental European firms. Their findings show 
that family firms do not engage in acquisitions that destroy shareholder wealth. Shim and 
Okamuro (2011) report that non-family firms have better merger performance than family 
firms for a sample of Japanese firms. Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) use a sample of Canadian 
firms and find that family firms have higher acquisition performance.  
Overall, the extant literature provides mixed evidence on how acquisition performance 
of family firms differs from that of non-family firms. One possible explanation for this mixed 
evidence could be that some acquisitions by family firms could be driven by the personal 
benefits of CEOs at the expense of shareholders’ interests. In this paper, we aim to advance 
our understanding of the acquisition decisions of family firms by investigating whether 
acquisition activity influences CEO compensation and CEO turnover in family firms in 
Continental Europe.  
2.2. Corporate acquisitions and CEO compensation in family firms  
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The concentrated ownership structure of family firms and the monitoring of 
management by families can have potential implications about how acquisitions affect CEO 
compensation packages. Families as major shareholders could have the power and incentives 
to monitor CEO decisions. Therefore, CEOs in family firms would not have the discretion to 
pursue acquisitions in an opportunistic way to expand their personal benefits, i.e., 
compensation packages, at the other shareholders’ expense.  Consequently, we would expect 
the association between CEO compensation and acquisition activity to be stronger in non-
family firms than in family firms.  
 Among family firms there could be differences in CEO decision-making, depending 
on the CEO type, i.e., family member versus professional (non-family member) CEO. Family 
CEOs and professional CEOs in family firms can differ in terms of their incentives (Miller et 
al., 2013). Agency theory suggests that there is a potential conflict of interest between 
professional CEOs and shareholders in family firms. Prior studies explore whether the type of 
CEO, i.e., family CEO vs. professional CEO, could influence firm performance; these studies 
provide mixed evidence. For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Morck et al. (1988) 
document a positive impact of family CEOs on firm performance, while Barth et al. (2005) 
and Smith and Amoko-Adu (1999) report that family CEOs have a negative impact on firm 
performance.4  
Family CEOs could be driven by an altruistic attitude toward future generations and 
pursue corporate strategies that would guarantee the long-term existence of the firm. Thus, 
they would be motivated to maximize the shareholder wealth. Lagaras and Tsoutsoura (2015) 
show that credit spreads are lower for family firms when family CEOs run the firms, 
suggesting that creditors assess firms with family CEOs as having lower agency costs of debt.  
                                                          
4 See also Bertrand (2009)  for further references on the performance of family CEOs in family firms.  
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Further, Lin and Hu (2007) show that both professional and family CEOs can improve firm 
performance, as long as strong governance mechanisms exist.  
Considering the different incentives family and professional CEOs in family firms 
might have, we hypothesize that acquisitions are more strongly associated with the 
compensation of professional CEOs than with that of family CEOs. Unlike professional 
CEOs, family CEOs whose interests are aligned with those of the controlling family’s 
shareholders might not engage in pursuing an acquisition as a way of expanding their 
compensation at the expense of the shareholders’ interests. However, there could be private 
benefits of control accruing to a controlling family when a member of the family holds the 
CEO position. As Burkart et al. (2003) argue, a family could expropriate other shareholders if 
a family member is the CEO. Further, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) report that family CEOs 
are less likely to adopt best managerial practices, which can be linked with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Bandiera et al. (2014) find that family CEOs work fewer hours than 
professional CEOs in family firms.   
2.3. Corporate acquisitions and CEO turnover in family firms  
Shleifer and Vishny (1989)’s entrenchment model describes how managers can 
entrench themselves through acquisitions. They argue that managers have incentives to 
engage in acquisitions, in particular ‘manager-specific’ acquisitions, as a way of making 
themselves valuable to shareholders and costly to replace. For instance, a manager can use the 
firm’s resources to acquire assets whose value is higher under him than under other 
alternative managers, even when those acquisitions can be value destroying. As a 
consequence of such entrenching acquisitions, replacing CEOs can be costly. Empirical 
evidence shows that an acquiring CEO can experience lessened risk of replacement (Yim, 
2013). Further Fich et al. (2014) find that CEOs’ deal-making activities, such as joint ventures 
and strategic alliances, reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement. Overall, the current 
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empirical results regarding the impact of deals on CEO replacement support Shleifer and 
Vishny’s entrenchment model of acquisitions. CEOs seem to have incentives to pursue deals 
in their efforts to maintain their status as CEO and reduce their likelihood of replacement.   
In family firms where families’ interests are well aligned with those of outside 
shareholders and families provide monitoring for CEOs, we would not expect CEOs to 
undertake acquisitions to reduce their likelihood of replacement. The presence of controlling 
family shareholders might, therefore, not allow CEOs to pursue entrenching acquisitions. In 
contrast, CEOs in non-family firms can use acquisitions as a way of reducing their likelihood 
of replacement while rewarding themselves with larger compensation packages following 
acquisitions.5 In this paper, we extend the current literature by investigating CEO retention 
policies in family firms and non-family firms during the post-acquisition period. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.1. Data  
Following Fernandes et al. (2013) and Croci et al. (2012), we obtain our sample of 
CEO compensation and CEO turnover data for Continental European non-financial firms over 
the period 2001-2008 from BoardEx. Our sample includes 15 European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. We collect data on acquisitions from the 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers database. Acquisitions include both domestic and foreign 
deals by bidders from our sample of European countries. Further, we extract institutional 
ownership from the ownership module of Thomson One Banker, while family ownership data 
                                                          
5 Anecdotal evidence also shows that family firms tend to stick to the CEOs they appoint, suggesting the 
presence of ‘strategic patience’ on the part of controlling family shareholders. Moreover, family firms show their 
commitment to giving a CEO sufficient time to implement his/her strategies. For instance, see “four lessons 
firms can learn from family businesses”, Christian Stadler, Forbes, April 30, 2015.   
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are primarily from the Amadeus database. Financial and accounting data are obtained from 
Datastream/Worldscope.  When we combine the data from these databases, our final sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 3,219 firm-year observations for 760 unique non-financial 
listed firms.6 
Following Franks et al. (2012), Lins et al. (2013), and Bennedsen et al. (2015), we 
classify a firm as a family firm if there is an individual or a group of family members with at 
least 25% of voting rights. Amadeus traces the control chains and calculates voting rights, 
identifying the ultimate owner who controls the firm directly with at least 25% of the voting 
rights or through a control chain with all links exceeding the 25% threshold. Thus, as a first 
step, for our sample firms, we seek to identify whether their ultimate owner is a family 
member or not.  A major difficulty arises if the ultimate owner is a private or listed company. 
In this case, we try to identify the ultimate owner of these private or listed companies to 
establish whether or not their ultimate owner is a family member. We supplement the 
ownership information in Amadeus with hand-collected data from annual reports and 
company websites.7 Consequently, 39% of our sample European firms are classified as family 
firms.  Portugal (83%), Italy (69%), France (50%), and Belgium (41%) have the largest 
percentages of family firms.8   
                                                          
6 A table reporting the distribution of our sample of non-financial firms across different countries is in the 
appendix. 
7 Thus, our definition of family firms does not include board representation/officers of family members. 
However, as Caprio et al. (2011) argue, in Continental European firms, the identity of the largest shareholder 
with relatively large voting power would be an effective way of identifying who is powerful in corporate 
decision-making, including CEO hiring and firing decisions. 
8 Les Hénokiens, which is a club of companies that are at least 200 years old, has remained under the control of 
one family throughout history and is still run by a family member,  has a list of the world’s oldest companies, 
where eight out of fifteen of these world’s oldest companies are Italian (The Economist, ‘The business of 
survival’, 2004).  
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Following Harford and Li (2007) and Yim (2013), for our sample of acquisitions, we 
include only relatively large-size acquisitions in our empirical analysis.9 The reason is that it 
is more likely to capture the impact of acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover 
if a deal size is relatively large. We apply filters of 5% and 10% as the relative size 
requirements for our sample of acquisitions, i.e., the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s 
value is at least 5% (10%). We measure the acquirer’s value using the market value of the 
total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the completion date. Our sample firms completed 
872 acquisitions over the period 2000-2007, as identified from the SDC database. When we 
use the 5% (10%) filter, the total number of acquisitions is reduced to 311 (191).10 
3.2. Empirical methodology   
3.2.1. Does acquisition activity influence CEO compensation in family firms? 
In our empirical analysis, we use two measures of CEO compensation: total CEO 
compensation (Total compensation) and CEO cash-based compensation (Cash compensation), 
which is the sum of the bonus and base salary during the year. Total compensation is the sum 
of cash-based and equity-based compensation, which is equal to the sum of the Black-Scholes 
value of stock options granted and the market value of restricted stocks granted during the 
year. Both compensation measures are expressed in thousands of Euros and are extracted 
from BoardEx. In order to test the impact of acquisitions on CEO compensation, we follow 
Harford and Li (2007) and Ozkan (2012) and use the following regression model: 
 
CEO payit =α + β1 Dummy acquisitionit-1 + δControlsit-1 + εit  (1) 
                                                          
9 Yim (2013) requires the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s market capitalization to be at least 5%, while 
Harford and Li (2007) use a filter of 10%, i.e., the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s market value of assets 
to be at least 10%.  
10 If there are multiple deals by an acquirer in a given year during our sample period, we consider the sum of 
those deals and apply our 5% (10%) filter accordingly. 
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where CEO pay is the natural logarithm of either Total compensation or Cash compensation. 
Dummy acquisition is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a firm-year following 
an acquisition, and zero otherwise. Controls include variables that are reported to influence 
CEO compensation by previous researchers. A positive and significant coefficient on Dummy 
acquisition would indicate that CEO compensation is larger following an acquisition. Model 
(1) allows us to test whether CEO compensation during the post-acquisition period reaches 
levels that cannot be explained by the values of its standard determinants.  
In our regression analysis, we control for lagged values of the following firm-specific 
financial variables: the natural logarithm of net sales in thousands of Euros as a firm-size 
proxy (Sales (log)), the ratio of the market value of assets to book value (Market-to-book), the  
return on assets minus the industry average of  return on assets (Industry-adjusted return on 
assets), the market-adjusted stock performance based on the local market index (Market-
adjusted return), and the standard deviation of the percentage daily return over a one-year 
period (Return standard deviation).  
Further, we include Family firm, which is a dummy variable for family firms, and 
governance variables including institutional ownership, a dummy variable for dual shares, and 
board characteristics.  Recently there has been an increase in the share ownership of 
Continental European companies by institutional investors (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Thus, we 
control for the potential monitoring role of institutional investors. Institutional ownership is 
the percentage of shareholdings by financial institutions, which include banks and trusts, 
insurance companies, investment advisors, pension funds, research firms, and sovereign 
wealth funds. Dual shares is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the company 
has a dual-class share structure, and zero otherwise. This variable captures the monitoring 
ability of controlling shareholders. Those controlling shareholders with dual-class shares may 
be entrenched because of a lower percentage of cash flow rights relative to control rights. We 
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also control for board characteristics, i.e., board size, proportion of independent board 
members, and board busyness, which are reported to influence the level of CEO compensation 
(Croci et al., 2012). Board size is the total number of executive and non-executive directors 
on a board; Board busyness is a dummy variable that equals one if a board has 50% or more 
of its directors holding three or more directorships in other public companies; and Board 
independence is the proportion of independent non-executive directors. We use CEO age as a 
proxy for the experience of CEOs. We also control for country, industry (using the Fama- 
French 49-industry classification), and year dummies.   
Next, we attempt to augment our equation (1) with dummy variables that specify 
acquiring family and non-family firms, and non-acquiring family and non-family firms. We 
classify our sample of firm-year observations into sub-groups based on whether or not they 
belong to the family firm group, and whether or not they engage in acquisitions.11 On the 
basis of this classification, we create dummy variables specifying each sub-group of the firm-
year observations. We use these dummy variables in our regression model to investigate 
whether family firms differ from non-family firms in the way they compensate their CEOs 
during the post-acquisition period. In particular, we examine whether, after controlling for a 
large set of firm-specific and governance variables, CEO compensation in family and non-
family firms increases during the post-acquisition period. 
Our dummy variables for the sub-groups of firm-year observations are as follows: 
Acquisition – Family is a dummy variable equal to one for family firms following 
acquisitions, and zero otherwise; Acquisition – Non-family is a dummy variable equal to one 
for non-family firms following acquisitions, and zero otherwise; Non-acquisition – Family is 
a dummy variable equal to one for family firms without acquisition activity, and zero 
                                                          
11 See Table A1 in the appendix for our classification of firms. 
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otherwise; finally, Non-acquisition – Non-family is a dummy variable equal to one for non-
family firms and without  acquisition activity, and zero otherwise.   In order to test whether 
CEOs in family firms receive an increase in their compensation during the post-acquisition 
period, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
CEO Payit = α + β1 Acquisition – Familyit-1 + β2 Acquisition – Non-familyit-1+  
β3 Non-acquisition – Familyit-1 + δ Controlsit-1 + εit   (2) 
 
The set of Controls is the same as that in model (1) with the exception of Family firm that is 
dropped from the set. The coefficient estimates of the three dummy variables, Acquisition – 
Family, Acquisition – Non-family, and Non-acquisition – Family, indicate the differences in 
CEO compensation for the three sub-groups of our sample relative to CEO compensation in 
non-family firms that are not involved in acquisitions (base group). A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on β2 would indicate that in non-family firms, CEO compensation is 
larger in the years following acquisitions than in other years. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn for family firms if the difference between β1 and β3 is positive and statistically 
significant. We perform a Wald test to compare these two coefficient estimates.  
Next, we classify family firms based on the identity of the CEO, distinguishing 
between family and professional CEOs in family firms. Family CEOs could be less 
entrenched and consider a long horizon in their decision-making, while professional CEOs in 
family firms could act in a way that maximizes their interests in the absence of effective 
family monitoring. We investigate whether the impact of acquisitions on CEO compensation 
varies, depending on the identity of CEOs in family firms, i.e., family CEOs and professional 
CEOs in family firms. Thus, we estimate the following regression model, including dummy 
variables, for family CEOs and professional CEOs in family firms:  
16 
 
 
CEO payit = α+ β1 Acquisition – Family CEOit-1 + β2 Acquisition – Professional CEOit-1+  
β3 Non-acquisition – Family CEOit-1 + β4 Non-acquisition – Professional CEOit-1 
β5 Acquisition – Non-familyit-1 + δ Controlsit-1 + εit    (3) 
 
where  Acquisition – Family CEO (Acquisition – Professional CEO) is a dummy variable 
equal to one for family firms with family (professional) CEOs in the years following 
acquisitions, and zero otherwise. In contrast, Non-acquisition – Family CEO (Non-acquisition 
– Professional CEO) is a dummy variable equal to one for family firms with family 
(professional) CEOs and no acquisition activity, and zero otherwise. Acquisition – Non-family 
is a dummy variable that has already been defined above. In this model, our base group 
contains observations of non-family firms that are not involved in acquisitions. Thus, the 
coefficient estimates for Acquisition – Family CEO, Acquisition – Professional CEO, Non-
acquisition – Family CEO, and Non-acquisition – Professional CEO can be interpreted as 
CEO pay differentials relative to CEOs in the base group. We are interested in testing whether 
the differences β1-β3 and β2-β4 are positive and statistically significant. To this end, we again 
perform a Wald test. 
To estimate equations (1), (2), and (3), we use pooled OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. We also include country, industry, and year dummies to control for 
country-specific, industry-specific, and year-specific fixed effects. Country dummies capture, 
for example, the differences in Continental European countries in terms of one-tiered or two-
tiered board structures and other country-specific governance characteristics.  
3.2.2. Does acquisition activity influence CEO turnover in family firms? 
 Acquisition activity can influence CEO compensation, as well as the likelihood of 
CEO turnover (Yim, 2013; Fich et al., 2014).  CEOs can undertake acquisitions to gain 
17 
 
personal benefits, i.e., a larger compensation package and a lower risk of dismissal, at 
shareholders’ expense (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In this paper, we examine 
how acquisition activity can influence CEO compensation, as well as CEO turnover risk, in 
family and non-family firms. If a controlling family shareholder provides monitoring for CEO 
compensation and CEO replacement decisions, CEOs cannot employ acquisition activity to 
enhance their personal benefits at shareholders’ expense. In contrast, CEOs in non-family 
firms can engage in acquisitions and thereby negotiate for larger compensation and lessen 
their risk of replacement following acquisitions. We examine the impact of acquisition 
activity on CEO turnover using the following logit regression model: 
 
CEO turnoverit =α + β1 Dummy acquisitionit-1 + δControlsit-1 + εit                          (4) 
 
CEO turnover is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the CEO leaves his/her firm 
during the year, and zero otherwise.12 Controls include firm-specific and governance 
variables, which are the same as those in equations (1) to (3) and are reported to be 
determinants of CEO turnover risk by previous researchers (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Fich et al., 
2014). In the next step, we also include dummies for sub-groups of family and non-family 
firms, with and without acquisition activity, and we report our results in section 5. 
 
4. Sample characteristics 
                                                          
12 Since we aim to study whether CEO replacements are less common in post-acquisition periods, we set the 
variable CEO turnover to one if the CEO has been in place for less than two calendar years. In post-acquisition 
years, a CEO’s tenure of two years or longer implies that the firm is certainly led by the same CEO, both before 
and after the acquisition activity. If an acquisition takes place in year t, and we have the same CEO, both at the 
end of year t-1 and at the end of year t+1, then there is no turnover around the acquisition, and the tenure of the 
CEO (time-in-role in BoardEx) is at least two years. To be consistent, we build the variable CEO turnover in the 
same way in periods, both with and without acquisition activity.  
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Panel A of Table 1 presents the deal characteristics for our sample of acquisitions with 
the 5% and 10% relative-size filters.13 Mean and median values of the deal size, relative deal 
size, number of days to complete and CARs (cumulative abnormal returns), proportion of 
domestic deals, focused deals, and public deals are reported for family and non-family firms.  
We rely on t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to determine whether there are statistically 
significant differences between these two sub-samples of firms. We observe that Deal size is 
significantly smaller for our sample of family firms than that of non-family firms. This 
finding is consistent with Caprio et al. (2011). For their sample of 777 European firms for the 
period 1998-2008, the mean acquisition size is Є 465.91 million for family firms, while it is Є 
879.87 million for non-family firms. Further, Relative deal size, which is the ratio of the deal 
size to the bidder’s market value of assets, is significantly smaller for family firms than for 
non-family firms for our sample of acquisitions with the 5% relative-size filter. Family firms 
seem to acquire relatively smaller size targets than those of non-family acquirers. Kachaner et 
al. (2012)’s survey results also show that family firms acquire fewer and smaller targets, since 
they are concerned about integration risk and change in the culture and fabric of the 
corporation. Moreover, for our sample of deals with the 5% relative-size filter, we observe 
that on average, family (non-family) firms complete acquisitions in 96 (88) days, while the 
median completion period is approximately 68 (66) days for family (non-family) firms. The 
average (median) completion period is considerably similar when the 10% filter is applied. 
Differences in Days to completion are not statistically significant.  
Next, we test whether there are significant differences in acquisition performance 
between family and non-family bidders. Following the literature, we measure acquisition 
                                                          
13 In our sample of acquisitions, there are firms that are involved in multiple acquisitions. If a firm is involved in 
multiple acquisition activities in a year, we cumulate the values of the acquisitions to compute Deal size and 
Relative deal size and rely on the value-weighted averages of the other variables in this panel. 
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performance by market-model adjusted abnormal returns around announcement dates. Thus, 
we calculate 5-day and 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using the event window  
(-2, +2) and (-1, +1), respectively. For our sample of acquisitions with a 5% relative-size 
filter, in Panel A of Table 1, we observe that the mean (median) CAR (-1, +1) is 1.88 % (1.24 
%) for family firms, while it is 2.02 % (1.35 %) for non-family firms. Moreover, we find that 
the mean and median values of CAR (-2, +2) are positive for both family and non-family 
firms. Notably, in both 3-day and 5-day event windows, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the average (median) CARs between family firms and non-family firms.  
Similarly, for our sample of acquisitions with a 10 % relative-size filter, we do not observe 
any statistically significant difference in the mean and median CARs between family and non-
family firms. These findings are consistent with Caprio et al. (2011), who show that family 
control does not influence acquisition performance measured by CARs around the 
announcement of the acquisition for their sample of European firms.   
We observe that family firms are more likely to be involved in domestic deals than 
non-family firms, but the differences between the two types of firms are not statistically 
significant. In our sample of acquisitions with a 5% relative size, on average, 54% of family 
and 59% of non-family acquisitions involve targets in the same Fama-French 49-industry 
classification. We also observe that the values for the variable Focused deal are not 
statistically different between the two sub-samples of family and non-family firms. Finally, 
we find that family firms are more likely to target public firms, but this finding is statistically 
significant only when we consider the 5% filter.14 
                                                          
14 We also checked whether there are differences between our sample of family and non-family firms in terms of 
engaging in serial acquisitions.  We define serial acquisitions as two or more successive acquisitions by the same 
firm within the same year. This definition is similar to that of Aktas et al. (2011), who define serial acquisitions 
as two successive acquisitions in a 12-month period.  We observe that the percentage of serial acquisitions made 
by family (non-family) firms is 35 (51) for our sample of acquisitions with a 10% relative-size filter. We find 
similar values when we consider our sample of acquisitions with a 5% relative-size filter. 
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In Panel B of Table 1, we consider our sample of acquisitions with the 5% relative-
size filter and report the descriptive statistics of the firm-specific characteristics for our full 
sample, and sub-samples of family and non-family firms, which are then classified as 
acquiring and non-acquiring firms.15 We define ‘acquiring firms’ as those that are involved in 
an acquisition at least once, while non-acquiring firms do not undertake any acquisitions 
during the sample period 2000-2007.16 We observe that on average, 32.3% of acquiring firms 
and 42.4% of non-acquiring firms are family firms, indicating that family firms are less likely 
to be engaged in acquisitions than non-family firms. Among family firms, 48% of non-
acquiring firms and 37.1% of acquiring firms have a family CEO. Thus, a family CEO is 
more common in non-acquiring family firms than in acquiring family firms.   
We note that average (median) Institutional ownership is significantly larger in 
acquiring than in non-acquiring firms, for both family and non-family firms. Recently 
anecdotal evidence has shown that institutional investors have been pioneers in shareholder 
activism in family firms in Europe. Our findings suggest that institutional investors can act as 
facilitators in the market for corporate control, for both family and non-family firms in 
continental European firms.17 Croci et al. (2012) argue that institutional investors could 
provide monitoring for determining CEO compensation, but they might reduce their 
monitoring if they observe that a family’s interests are in alignment with the interests of 
minority shareholders, and that controlling family shareholders monitor CEO compensation 
effectively.  
                                                          
15 For space considerations, we do not tabulate the descriptive statistics for our sample of acquisitions with a 
10% relative size threshold, but they are available in the appendix. 
16 As mentioned previously, our sample period for our full sample of firms is 2001-2008, but we consider 
acquisitions that are completed during the period 2000-2007, since we examine how acquisitions influence CEO 
compensation during the post-acquisition year. 
17 Ferreira et al. (2010) provide evidence of foreign institutional investors playing an important role of 
governance and facilitating cross-border acquisitions.  
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On average Board busyness and Board independence are significantly larger for 
acquiring firms than for non-acquiring firms. In fact, both acquiring family and non-family 
firms have more independent and busier directors than non-acquiring family and non-family 
firms. Notably, these findings suggest that independent and busy directors can act as 
facilitators for acquisition activity in both family and non-family firms.    
We observe that in our sample of family and non-family firms, the median Sales is 
larger for acquiring firms than non-acquiring firms. We find that in family firms, the median 
Market-to-book is larger for acquiring firms than non-acquiring firms. In contrast, in non-
family firms, the median Market-to-book is smaller for acquiring firms than non-acquiring 
firms. In both family and non-family firms, there is no statistically significant difference in 
the median Market-adjusted return between acquiring and non-acquiring firms. Further, we 
do not observe any statistically significant difference in the Return standard deviation 
between acquiring and non-acquiring firms.  
In Panel C of Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics for the level of CEO total 
and cash compensation, and CEO turnover for acquiring and non-acquiring firms. We observe 
that both acquiring and non-acquiring firms rely more on cash compensation than equity-
based compensation. Both in the full sample and in the sub-sample of non-family firms, we 
observe that both CEO cash and total compensation are higher in acquiring firms than in non-
acquiring firms. Further, there is no statistically significant difference between acquiring and 
non-acquiring family firms in terms of CEO compensation. In contrast, we find that CEO 
compensation is statistically significantly higher in acquiring non-family firms than non-
acquiring non-family firms. 
We note that there is a statistically significant difference in average CEO turnover 
between acquiring non-family and non-acquiring non-family firms. In contrast, average CEO 
turnover in acquiring family firms is not statistically significantly different from CEO 
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turnover in non-acquiring family firms. Further, we observe that average CEO turnover for 
family CEOs in acquiring (non-acquiring) family firms is 18.6 % (14.3 %), while it is 32.5 % 
(33.7 %) for professional CEOs in acquiring (non-acquiring) family firms. This finding is 
consistent with Volpin (2002), showing that top executive turnover is lower for those 
executives belonging to the family of the controlling shareholder than for other executives. 
Further, Kachaner et al. (2012) find that on average, family firms have a relatively lower 
turnover of workforce than non-family firms, thus creating a culture of commitment.   
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. CEO compensation and acquisitions 
In this section, we test whether acquisitions can influence the level of CEO total and 
cash compensation for our sample of Continental European firms. Table 2 reports our 
estimation results for our whole sample, including both family and non-family firms. We 
observe that the coefficient estimate for Dummy acquisition is positive and statistically 
significant for the regressions of the level of total and cash compensation. Thus, the CEOs of 
acquiring firms have higher levels of total and cash compensation following an acquisition 
than any other years when there is no acquisition, and also than firms that are not involved in 
an acquisition during the sample period. This finding is consistent with prior findings in the 
literature (Harford and Li, 2007; Ozkan, 2012). 
We use filters for both 5% and 10% as the threshold of the relative size of deals and 
observe that acquisitions have a positive and significant effect on CEO total compensation 
and cash compensation, regardless of which filter we use. We also interact stock return, as a 
measure of firm performance, with the acquisition dummy to test whether CEO pay-
performance sensitivity changes during the post-acquisition period. In untabulated findings, 
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we observe that there is no significant variation in pay-performance sensitivity following an 
acquisition. Thus, CEOs can engage in acquisitions and expand their compensation packages 
without making their pay more sensitive to changes in firm performance.  
We find that the CEOs in family firms have significantly lower levels of total 
compensation. CEO cash compensation is not significantly different between family and non-
family firms. Our results show that market-adjusted stock returns and the riskiness of stock 
returns have no significant impact on CEO compensation. Similarly, we observe that the 
accounting-based measure of firm performance is not statistically significantly related to CEO 
compensation. We find that firm size, measured by the log of sales, the market-to-book ratio, 
and total institutional ownership has a positive and significant impact on the level of CEO 
compensation. The finding for institutional ownership suggests that an increase in the 
ownership of institutional investors in Continental European firms leads to a higher level of 
CEO cash and total compensation. Consistent with previous studies (Masulis et al., 2009; 
Amoako-Adu et al., 2011), we find that the presence of dual-class shares has a positive and 
significant impact on CEO compensation, indicating that firms with a dual-class equity 
structure pay more to their CEOs. We also observe that CEO compensation increases with 
board size and the percentage of busy board members. This finding supports the argument that 
larger boards can have problems with coordination, communication, and monitoring of the 
management, which can lead to a higher level of CEO compensation. The coefficient estimate 
for the ratio of independent directors is also positive and significant. Independent board 
members do not seem to be effective in providing monitoring for CEO compensation 
packages in Continental Europe. Furthermore, the coefficient estimate for CEO age is not 
statistically significant. To summarize, our results in Table 2 show that controlling for 
relevant firm-specific characteristics and CEO age, there is an increase in CEO compensation 
following acquisitions in our sample of Continental European firms. This finding supports the 
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notion of empire-building incentives of CEOs, i.e., CEOs can be motivated to undertake 
acquisitions with the purpose of rewarding themselves with larger compensation. 
[Table 2 about here] 
5.2. CEO compensation, acquisitions, and the role of family control 
 Next, we specify four different sub-samples: acquiring family firms (Acquisition - 
Family), acquiring non-family firms (Acquisition – Non-family), non-acquiring family firms 
(Non-acquisition – Family), and non-acquiring non-family firms. Table 3 presents the 
estimation results of equation (2) including p-values for the Wald tests to analyse statistical 
differences between the coefficient estimates for Acquisition – Family and Non-acquisition – 
Family. The results for Acquisition – Non-family show that in the year after acquisitions, the 
CEOs of non-family firms have a significantly larger total of cash compensation than in other 
years.  In contrast, the larger p-values of the Wald tests imply that the estimated coefficients 
on Acquisition – Family and Non-acquisition – Family are not significantly different. These 
results indicate that CEO compensation is higher for acquiring non-family firms than non-
acquiring non-family firms.18 On the other hand, controlling family shareholders seem to 
provide monitoring for CEO compensation and prevent significant increases in compensation 
during the post-acquisition period.  
[Table 3 about here] 
5.3. CEO compensation, acquisitions, and the role of family CEO  
Table 4 reports the estimation results of our equation (3) and compares CEO 
compensation of family and professional CEOs in family firms in the post-acquisition 
                                                          
18 We also run regressions controlling for the anti-director index from Spamann (2010).  One could argue that in 
countries with weaker shareholder protection, the impact of controlling family shareholders could be stronger. 
However, in our untabulated results, we do not observe any significant impact of investor protection on the 
relationship between CEO compensation and acquisition activity.   
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period.19 The p-values of the Wald tests indicate that the compensation levels of family CEOs 
in acquiring family firms (Acquisition – Family CEO) are not statistically significantly 
different from those of family CEOs in non-acquiring family firms (Non-acquisition – Family 
CEO). In contrast, at the 10% relative deal size threshold, the coefficient on Acquisition – 
Professional CEO is significantly larger than that on Non-acquisition – Professional CEO. 
These results indicate that, unlike family CEOs, professional CEOs may be able to exploit 
acquisitions to increase their compensation in the post-acquisition period. This finding is 
consistent with the survey results of Mullins and Schoar (2015), who report that professional 
CEOs of family firms seem very similar to CEOs of non-family firms in terms of their 
business philosophies and management strategies.   
 [Table 4 about here] 
5.4. CEO turnover and acquisitions in family and non-family firms 
 In this section, we investigate whether the likelihood of CEO turnover increases 
during the post-acquisition period.  We observe that CEOs in non-family firms receive an 
increase in their compensation following acquisitions, but this increase in compensation can 
involve a trade-off, i.e., an increase in the risk of CEO turnover for acquiring firms.  Thus, 
CEOs facing this trade-off might not be fully motivated to pursue acquisitions in an 
opportunistic way, since their larger compensation package comes at the expense of a higher 
risk of termination.   
                                                          
19 Additionally, we test whether ‘founder family’ specification can make a difference.  In our sample of family 
firms, 27% of them are classified as ‘founder family’ firms, where the founding family is still the controlling 
shareholder. It may be important to run this robustness check, since founding families may be more attached to 
the firm they created and have more reputational concerns. Moreover, our main definition of family firm implies 
that one or more individuals acting in concert are a family. We repeat our regression analysis using the ‘founder 
family’ classification and find that our results remain the same. For space considerations, we do not tabulate 
these results. 
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 We run logit regressions with a CEO turnover dummy as a dependent variable, which 
is equal to one if the CEO leaves office in the current year, and zero otherwise.  In Table 5, 
we find that the coefficient on Dummy acquisition is negative and significant. This result 
indicates that CEOs engaging in acquisitions are less likely to be replaced than non-acquiring 
CEOs.  We also interact the acquisition dummy with firm performance as proxied by stock 
returns to see whether poorly performing firms are more likely to fire their CEOs during the 
post-acquisition period.  In untabulated analyses, we find that firm performance does not 
influence the relationship between CEO turnover risk and acquisition activity, i.e., acquiring 
CEOs reduce their risk of being replaced, regardless of their performance.   
[Table 5 about here] 
Next we include dummies for family and non-family firms to test whether there is a 
difference between family and non-family firms in terms of CEO replacement following an 
acquisition.  In Table 6, we observe that the coefficient for Acquisition – Non-family is 
negative and statistically significant, regardless of which filter we use (that is, 5% or 10%). 
Our results suggest that CEOs in non-family firms can reduce their likelihood of replacement 
by engaging in an acquisition. For family firms, we do not find any significant relation 
between the risk of CEO turnover and acquisition activity. For both the 5% and 10% filters, 
the Wald tests show that differences between the coefficient estimates for Acquisition - 
Family and Non-acquisition – Family are statistically insignificant. Thus, CEOs in family 
firms do not seem to be able to engage in acquisitions as a way of reducing their risk of 
termination, while CEOs in non-family firms can pursue acquisitions for entrenchment 
purposes, i.e., to reduce their risk of dismissal due to poor performance. One explanation for 
this finding of insignificant impact of acquisition activity on the likelihood of CEO turnover 
in family firms could be that family firms have a longer horizon in their decision-making and 
do not consider short-term corporate outcomes in their CEO turnover decisions. Kachaner et 
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al. (2012) report that family firms extol the benefits of longer employee tenure, which can 
help with efficient team dynamics and a collective mindset. Their survey results also show 
that family firms focus on creating a culture of commitment and purpose.  
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7, we test whether there are differences between family and professional 
CEOs in family firms in terms of their likelihood of replacement following an acquisition. 
The Wald test results show that there is no statistically significant difference between 
acquiring family CEOs and non-acquiring family CEOs in terms of their risk of replacement 
during the post-acquisition period. Similarly, we do not find a statistically significant 
difference between acquiring professional CEOs and non-acquiring professional CEOs in 
family firms in terms of their risk of replacement following an acquisition. 
[Table 7 about here] 
5.5. Matching estimation 
There is a possibility that our results of the impact of acquisitions on CEO 
compensation and CEO turnover for our sample of Continental European firms could be 
driven by a potential endogeneity problem. Our sample of acquiring firms could differ from 
non-acquiring firms in a systematic manner. Moreover, acquiring firms can self-select 
themselves, based on their characteristics. Thus, some underlying variables could explain both 
the increase in CEO compensation (or decrease in the likelihood of CEO replacement) and 
firms’ acquisition activity. Consequently, the presence of these confounding variables could 
lead us to mistakenly attribute the changes in CEO compensation and likelihood of CEO 
turnover to firms’ acquisition activity. Even though in our multivariate models we control for 
a large set of observable determinants of CEO compensation and turnover, there is no 
guarantee that acquiring and non-acquiring firms share a common support. In order to 
mitigate this endogeneity concern and biases due to selection on observables, we use the bias-
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corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimator and the coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
estimator. Overall, our findings from the matching estimation methods support the results 
from pooled OLS estimation.  
5.5.1. Bias-corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimator 
In order to estimate the average treatment effects (ATEs) of the acquisitions on the 
outcome variables (CEO compensation and CEO turnover), we use the bias-corrected nearest-
neighbour matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). If there are some 
observable confounders that affect both the treatment and outcome variables, a matching 
estimator can reduce biases in the ATE estimates (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). By using these 
confounders in matching, we can obtain more reliable estimates of the ATEs. As matching 
variables, we use all of our control variables in regression models, except for the dummy for 
family firms and year, country, and industry dummies. Table 8 reports the estimates of the 
treatment effects of an acquisition on CEO compensation and CEO turnover for the two sub-
samples of family and non-family firms. In our matching, we use one, three, and five matches 
and find that our results are consistent. We observe statistically significant ATEs in the sub-
samples of non-family firms, implying that an acquisition leads to significant increases in 
CEO compensation and reductions in CEO turnover. For family firms, the ATEs are often 
statistically insignificant. Even when significant findings can be reported for family firms, the 
p-values of the ATEs are quite large, compared with those for non-family firms. Overall, our 
matching estimation results support our regression results from Table 2 to Table 7. 
[Table 8 about here] 
5.5.2. Coarsened exact matching estimator 
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Next, we test the robustness of our findings by using a coarsened exact matching 
estimation method.20  The key characteristics of CEM is that it belongs to a class of matching 
methods called Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB), which bounds the maximum 
imbalance between the treated and control groups, i.e., the distributions of the covariates in 
the groups are more similar (Iacus et al., 2011). Further, Iacus et al. (2012) show that CEM 
bounds both the error in estimating the average treatment effect and the amount of model 
dependence. CEM is applied by creating strata based on the cut-off points of matching 
variables. Observations from strata that do not contain both treated and control observations 
are dropped from the sample in order to ensure that treated and control observations share a 
common support. In order to mitigate the reduction in sample size, we only consider the 
following continuous control variables from our multivariate models that are also found to be 
significant determinants of the likelihood of an acquisition in our sample: Institutional 
ownership, Board busyness, Sales (log), Market-to-book, and Market-adjusted return. 
Quartiles of these variables are used to create the strata and select the sub-samples of better 
matched firm-years. When relying on the 5% (10%) relative size filter, we have 302 (188) 
treated and 1,448 (1,111) control firm-years. In Table 9, we re-estimate our main regression 
models using the sub-sample, based on the 5% filter, and report results that are consistent with 
those in previous sections of the paper. The findings are qualitatively similar if we instead 
consider the smaller sub-sample for the 10% filter.  
[Table 9 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                          
20 Feldman et al. (2014) also employ a coarsened exact matching model to investigate the impact of divestitures 
on the firm value of family firms, considering the non-random selection of divestitures. 
30 
 
There is an extensive literature that highlights the differences in family and non-family 
firms in terms of performance, disclosure, financial structure, and governance. To a large 
extent, these differences are explained by the presence of different types of agency problems 
in family and non-family firms. In this paper, we put forward a hypothesis regarding how 
corporate acquisitions influence CEO compensation and CEO turnover in family and non-
family firms. We argue that in an environment where controlling family shareholders provide 
monitoring, CEOs cannot pursue acquisitions as a way of gaining greater job security and 
expanding their compensation packages, regardless of potential shareholder wealth loss. 
However, in non-family firms, where agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and control are prevalent, CEOs can pursue acquisitions in an opportunistic 
manner, thereby enhancing their self-interest at the expense of shareholders.   
   We empirically investigate the impact of corporate acquisitions on CEO compensation 
and CEO turnover in bidder family and non-family firms in Continental Europe. For our 
empirical analysis, we use a dataset of 3,219 firm-year observations over the period 2001-
2008. We provide, to our knowledge, the first empirical evidence on the impact of 
acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover in family versus non-family firms. We 
find that acquisitions have a positive and significant effect on the level of CEO cash and total 
compensation in our sample of Continental European firms.  
When we classify our sample of firms into family and non-family firms, we find that 
acquisitions lead to a higher level of CEO total and cash compensation in non-family firms, 
while we do not observe any significant impact of acquisitions on the level of CEO 
compensation in family firms. Further, professional CEOs in family firms experience an 
increase in their compensation during post-acquisition, while acquisitions do not have a 
significant impact on the compensation of family CEOs in family firms. This finding suggests 
that controlling family shareholders do not provide monitoring for professional CEOs in 
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family firms engaging in acquisitions as an opportunistic way of expanding their 
compensation packages. Thus, professional CEOs in family firms would have the motivation 
to make acquisitions, given that they can experience an increase in their compensation during 
the post-acquisition period. Moreover, our results show that acquisitions do not have a 
significant impact on CEO turnover in family firms, while CEOs in non-family firms seem to 
reduce their likelihood of replacement during the post-acquisition period. Finally, our findings 
help advance our knowledge and understanding of how family and non-family firms differ in 
terms of CEO compensation and CEO replacement policies during the post-acquisition 
period. 
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Table 1: Sample statistics 
This table reports the mean and median values of several deal characteristics, firm characteristics, and the 
dependent variables used in this study. We apply a filter of 5% and 10% as a relative size requirement for our 
sample of acquisitions, i.e., the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s value is at least 5% (10%). The acquirer’s 
value is defined as the market value of total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the completion date. Variable 
definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. We test differences in means (medians) using t-tests 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). In Panel A, we test whether there are significant differences between family and non-
family firms. In Panel B and in Panel C, we compare non-acquiring to acquiring firms. The symbols ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Deal characteristics  
 Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
5% of the relative-size filter for acquisitions 
Deal size 100 619.787 251.981 211 1,316.392*** 453.800** 
Relative deal size 100 0.170 0.107 211 0.198* 0.141* 
Days to completion 100 96.044 68.531 211 88.075 66.584 
CAR(-1,+1) 97 1.876 1.239 208 2.017 1.353 
CAR(-2,+2) 97 2.369 2.033 208 2.122 1.783 
Domestic deal 100 0.486 0.436 211 0.409 0.000 
Focused deal 100 0.538 0.966 211 0.587 0.977 
Public deal 100 0.389 0.000 211 0.281* 0.000** 
10% of the relative-size filter for acquisitions 
Deal size 54 825.266 362.497 137 1,538.552*** 617.187* 
Relative deal size 54 0.254 0.204 137 0.268 0.212 
Days to completion 54 89.045 72.479 137 91.156 72.145 
CAR(-1,+1) 53 2.042 1.493 136 2.219 1.389 
CAR(-2,+2) 53 3.065 3.042 136 2.487 2.197 
Domestic deal 54 0.519 0.619 137 0.410 0.000 
Focused deal 54 0.593 1.000 137 0.606 0.989 
Public deal 54 0.341 0.000 137 0.344 0.000 
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Panel B: Firm characteristics (5% of the relative-size filter for acquisitions) 
 All Sample (N=3,219) Family Firms  (N=1,247) Non-Family Firms  (N=1,972) 
 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=2,053) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=1,166) 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=870) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=377) 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=1,183) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=789) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Family firm 0.424 0.000 0.323*** 0.000***         
Family CEO 0.204 0.000 0.120*** 0.000*** 0.480 0.000 0.371*** 0.000***     
Institutional ownership 0.172 0.138 0.212*** 0.188*** 0.128 0.106 0.148*** 0.130*** 0.205 0.184 0.243*** 0.214*** 
Board size 11.230 10.000 11.433 11.000*** 10.353 10.000 10.631 10.000 11.875 11 11.816 11* 
Board busyness 0.319 0.000 0.473*** 0.000*** 0.321 0.000 0.459*** 0.000*** 0.318 0.000 0.479*** 0.000*** 
Board independence 0.212 0.182 0.268*** 0.235*** 0.181 0.143 0.222*** 0.200*** 0.234 0.2 0.29*** 0.25*** 
CEO age 53.146 53.000 53.529 53.000 53.617 53.000 52.745 52.000** 52.8 53 53.904*** 54*** 
Dual shares 0.254 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.222 0.000 
Sales 5,457.0 993.6 6,657.8*** 1,444.7*** 4,543.0 857.8 2,846.8*** 880.4 6,129.2 1,123.5 8,478.7*** 1,956.1*** 
Market-to-book 1.790 1.420 1.597*** 1.386** 1.788 1.425 1.650*** 1.453 1.792 1.417 1.571*** 1.35*** 
Industry-adjusted 
return on assets 0.007 0.005 -0.002** 0.000** 0.017 0.010 0.012 0.010 
-0.001 0.000 -0.009* -0.004* 
Market-adjusted return 0.070 0.011 0.069 0.013 0.081 0.018 0.056 0.005 0.062 0.007 0.076 0.025 
Return standard  
deviation 2.144 1.892 2.133 1.867 2.037 1.839 2.041 1.798 
 
2.223 
 
1.946 
 
2.177 
 
1.91 
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Panel C: CEO Total, Cash Compensation, and Turnover (5% of the relative-size filter for acquisitions) 
 All Sample (N=3,219) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=2,053) Acquiring Firms (N=1,166) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,308.902 670.186 1,688.983*** 840.269*** 
Cash compensation 915.906 588.989 1,029.451*** 694.705*** 
CEO turnover 0.267 0 0.26 0 
 Family Firms (N=1,247) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=870) Acquiring Firms (N=377) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,305.198 578.738 1,267.330 663.662 
Cash compensation 918.096 530.066 865.847 569.107 
CEO turnover 0.238 0 0.281 0 
 Non-Family Firms (N=1,972) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=1183) Acquiring Firms (N=789) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,311.627 746.553 1,890.457*** 945.435*** 
Cash compensation 914.295 628.733 1,107.625*** 760.624*** 
CEO turnover 0.288 0 0.25* 0* 
 Family CEO (N=558) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=418) Acquiring Firms (N=140) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,067.066 414.777 1,031.876 426.619 
Cash compensation 802.363 401.642 760.316 365.908 
CEO turnover 0.143 0 0.186 0 
 Professional CEO (N=689) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=452) Acquiring Firms (N=237) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,525.416 773.756 1,406.418 778.639 
Cash compensation 1,025.122 650.693 928.186 684.834 
CEO turnover 0.325 0 0.337 0 
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Table 2: CEO compensation and acquisitions  
This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation and 
the natural logarithm of CEO cash compensation. All regressions include country, industry, and year fixed effects. 
The ownership and financial variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions can 
be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Total compensation (log) Cash compensation (log) 
Dummy acquisition (5%) 0.139**  0.0932*  
 (0.0610)  (0.0562)  
Dummy acquisition (10%)  0.230***  0.196*** 
  (0.0749)  (0.0672) 
Family firm -0.132* -0.131* -0.0977 -0.0967 
 (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0638) (0.0637) 
Institutional ownership 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.642*** 0.633*** 
 (0.201) (0.200) (0.185) (0.185) 
Board size 0.0417*** 0.0413*** 0.0366*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.00954) (0.00956) (0.00898) (0.00899) 
Board busyness 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.148** 0.147** 
 (0.0646) (0.0645) (0.0593) (0.0593) 
Board independence 0.466*** 0.472*** 0.274* 0.279* 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.158) (0.158) 
CEO age -0.00620 -0.00612 -0.00174 -0.00167 
 (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00383) (0.00382) 
Dual shares 0.148** 0.147** 0.119* 0.119* 
 (0.0724) (0.0723) (0.0653) (0.0652) 
Sales (log) 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0263) (0.0263) 
Market-to-book 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.0968*** 0.0985*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0258) 
Industry-adjusted  
return on assets -0.369 -0.357 -0.119 -0.110 
 (0.261) (0.261) (0.244) (0.244) 
Market-adjusted return 0.0136 0.00662 0.0355 0.0285 
 (0.0433) (0.0429) (0.0398) (0.0394) 
Return standard  
deviation 0.0137 0.0126 0.0127 0.0114 
 (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0260) (0.0259) 
Constant 2.259*** 2.243*** 2.327*** 2.303*** 
 (0.450) (0.450) (0.416) (0.415) 
     
Observations 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 
R-squared 0.461 0.462 0.438 0.439 
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Table 3: CEO compensation and acquisitions in family and non-family firms 
This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation and 
CEO cash compensation for our whole sample of family and non-family firms. All regressions include country, 
industry, and year fixed effects. The ownership and financial variables are lagged with respect to the dependent 
variable. Variable definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Total compensation (log) Cash compensation (log) 
Acquisition (5%) - Family (B1) -0.0704  -0.105  
 (0.124)  (0.111)  
Acquisition (10%) - Family (B1)  0.0726  0.0689 
  (0.143)  (0.123) 
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family (B2) 0.185***  0.151**  
 (0.0707)  (0.0659)  
Acquisition (10%) - Non-family (B2)  0.242***  0.210** 
  (0.0904)  (0.0817) 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family (B3) -0.119*  -0.0817  
 (0.0698)  (0.0646)  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family (B3)  -0.128*  -0.0942 
  (0.0692)  (0.0641) 
Institutional ownership 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.642*** 0.633*** 
 (0.201) (0.200) (0.185) (0.185) 
Board size 0.0416*** 0.0413*** 0.0365*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.00956) (0.00957) (0.00901) (0.00900) 
Board busyness 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.149** 0.147** 
 (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0594) (0.0593) 
Board independence 0.469*** 0.473*** 0.277* 0.280* 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.158) (0.158) 
CEO age -0.00623 -0.00612 -0.00178 -0.00167 
 (0.00413) (0.00413) (0.00382) (0.00382) 
Dual shares 0.148** 0.147** 0.119* 0.119* 
 (0.0724) (0.0723) (0.0654) (0.0652) 
Sales (log) 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0263) (0.0263) 
Market-to-book 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.0966*** 0.0984*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0258) 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -0.366 -0.357 -0.116 -0.110 
 (0.261) (0.261) (0.245) (0.245) 
Market-adjusted return 0.0135 0.00686 0.0354 0.0288 
 (0.0433) (0.0430) (0.0397) (0.0394) 
Return standard deviation 0.0130 0.0125 0.0118 0.0113 
 (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0260) (0.0258) 
Constant 2.246*** 2.240*** 2.310*** 2.300*** 
 (0.450) (0.451) (0.416) (0.416) 
     
Observations 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 
R-squared 0.462 0.462 0.439 0.439 
     
p-value B1=B3 0.657 0.114 0.811 0.131 
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Table 4: CEO compensation, acquisitions, and CEO type 
This table reports the estimates of the OLS regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation and 
CEO cash compensation for our whole sample of family and non-family firms. All regressions include country, 
industry, and year fixed effects. The ownership and financial variables are lagged with respect to the dependent 
variable. Variable definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in brackets. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Total compensation (log) Cash compensation (log) 
Acquisition (5%) - Family CEO (B1) -0.288  -0.315*  
 (0.211)  (0.189)  
Acquisition (10%) - Family CEO (B1)  -0.191  -0.151 
  (0.201)  (0.193) 
Acquisition (5%) - Professional CEO (B2) 0.0515  0.0154  
 (0.136)  (0.122)  
Acquisition (10%) - Professional CEO (B2)  0.226  0.199 
  (0.181)  (0.148) 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family CEO (B3) -0.169  -0.0848  
 (0.115)  (0.106)  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family CEO (B3)  -0.182  -0.104 
  (0.114)  (0.105) 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Professional CEO (B4) -0.0867  -0.0807  
 (0.0766)  (0.0710)  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Professional CEO (B4)  -0.0943  -0.0894 
  (0.0753)  (0.0697) 
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family 0.185***  0.151**  
 (0.0706)  (0.0658)  
Acquisition (10%) - Non-family  0.242***  0.210** 
  (0.0902)  (0.0816) 
Institutional ownership 0.726*** 0.721*** 0.639*** 0.632*** 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.185) (0.185) 
Board size 0.0407*** 0.0404*** 0.0364*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.00981) (0.00981) (0.00922) (0.00922) 
Board busyness 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.147** 0.145** 
 (0.0650) (0.0651) (0.0597) (0.0598) 
Board independence 0.463*** 0.464*** 0.276* 0.276* 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.158) (0.158) 
CEO age -0.00604 -0.00587 -0.00172 -0.00156 
 (0.00420) (0.00420) (0.00387) (0.00387) 
Dual shares 0.143* 0.142* 0.118* 0.117* 
 (0.0735) (0.0732) (0.0664) (0.0662) 
Sales (log) 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0263) (0.0262) 
Market-to-book 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.0960*** 0.0980*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0260) (0.0259) 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -0.352 -0.340 -0.112 -0.103 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.245) (0.245) 
Market-adjusted return 0.0161 0.00981 0.0371 0.0306 
 (0.0432) (0.0430) (0.0396) (0.0394) 
Return standard deviation 0.0125 0.0119 0.0123 0.0115 
 (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0259) (0.0257) 
Constant 2.274*** 2.271*** 2.306*** 2.302*** 
 (0.444) (0.446) (0.408) (0.409) 
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Observations 3,219 3,219 3,219 3,219 
R-squared 0.462 0.463 0.439 0.440 
     
p-value B1=B3 0.546 0.964 0.186 0.786 
p-value B2=B4 0.269 0.0540 0.391 0.0304 
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Table 5: CEO turnover and acquisitions  
This table reports the estimates of the logit regressions for CEO turnover. All regressions include country, industry, and 
year fixed effects. The ownership and financial variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. Variable 
definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 
Marginal effects, which are computed at the means of the covariates, are in square brackets. For binary variables, marginal 
effects are computed as discrete differences from the base level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 CEO turnover CEO turnover 
Dummy acquisition (5%) -0.330**  
 (0.149)  
 [-0.056]  
Dummy acquisition (10%)  -0.398** 
  (0.189) 
  [-0.066] 
Family firm -0.0236 -0.0238 
 (0.131) (0.131) 
 [-0.004] [-0.004] 
Institutional ownership -0.198 -0.200 
 (0.469) (0.468) 
 [-0.036] [-0.036] 
Board size 0.0169 0.0174 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Board busyness -0.0812 -0.0851 
 (0.126) (0.126) 
 [-0.015] [-0.015] 
Board independence -0.0694 -0.0757 
 (0.293) (0.293) 
 [-0.013] [-0.014] 
CEO age -0.0498*** -0.0499*** 
 (0.00792) (0.00790) 
 [-0.009] [-0.009] 
Dual shares -0.0930 -0.0885 
 (0.138) (0.138) 
 [-0.017] [-0.016] 
Sales (log) 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0456) 
 [0.025] [0.025] 
Market-to-book -0.00582 -0.00454 
 (0.0683) (0.0681) 
 [-0.001] [-0.001] 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -2.482*** -2.504*** 
 (0.618) (0.616) 
 [-0.453] [-0.457] 
Market-adjusted return -0.276** -0.270** 
 (0.122) (0.122) 
 [-0.05] [-0.049] 
Return standard deviation 0.131* 0.131* 
 (0.0682) (0.0683) 
 [0.024] [0.024] 
Constant -15.35*** -15.35*** 
 (1.282) (1.295) 
   
Observations 3,219 3,219 
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Table 6: CEO turnover and acquisitions in family and non-family firms 
This table reports the estimates of the logit regressions for the CEO turnover in our entire sample of family and non-family 
firms. All regressions include country, industry, and year fixed effects. The ownership and financial variables are lagged 
with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Marginal effects, which are computed at the means of the covariates, 
are in square brackets. For binary variables, marginal effects are computed as discrete differences from the base level. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CEO turnover CEO turnover 
Acquisition (5%) - Family (B1) -0.185  
 (0.256)  
 [-0.032]  
Acquisition (10%) - Family (B1)  -0.0949 
  (0.323) 
  [-0.017] 
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family (B2) -0.426**  
 (0.190)  
 [-0.07]  
Acquisition (10%) - Non-family (B2)  -0.549** 
  (0.236) 
  [-0.087] 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family (B3) -0.0476  
 (0.133)  
 [-0.009]  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family (B3)  -0.0480 
  (0.132) 
  [-0.009] 
Institutional ownership -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.469) (0.468) 
 [-0.036] [-0.036] 
Board size 0.0171 0.0176 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Board busyness -0.0836 -0.0882 
 (0.126) (0.125) 
 [-0.015] [-0.016] 
Board independence -0.0750 -0.0831 
 (0.293) (0.293) 
 [-0.014] [-0.015] 
CEO age -0.0497*** -0.0499*** 
 (0.00790) (0.00789) 
 [-0.009] [-0.009] 
Dual shares -0.0930 -0.0904 
 (0.138) (0.138) 
 [-0.017] [-0.016] 
Sales (log) 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0455) 
 [0.025] [0.025] 
Market-to-book -0.00559 -0.00335 
 (0.0682) (0.0681) 
 [-0.001] [-0.001] 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -2.488*** -2.505*** 
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 (0.616) (0.614) 
 [-0.454] [-0.457] 
Market-adjusted return -0.277** -0.274** 
 (0.122) (0.122) 
 [-0.05] [-0.05] 
Return standard deviation 0.132* 0.132* 
 (0.0683) (0.0684) 
 [0.024] [0.024] 
Constant -15.33*** -15.32*** 
 (1.282) (1.253) 
   
Observations 3,219 3,219 
p-value B1=B3 0.565 0.880 
Table 7: CEO turnover, acquisitions, and CEO type 
This table reports the estimates of the logit regressions for the CEO turnover in our entire sample of family and 
non-family firms. All regressions include country, industry, and year fixed effects. The ownership and financial 
variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. Variable definitions can be found in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Marginal effects, which are 
computed at the means of the covariates, are in square brackets. For binary variables, marginal effects are 
computed as discrete differences from the base level. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CEO turnover CEO turnover 
Acquisition (5%) - Family CEO (B1) -0.678  
 (0.428)  
 [-0.101]  
Acquisition (10%) - Family CEO (B1)  -1.308* 
  (0.716) 
  [-0.16] 
Acquisition (5%) - Professional CEO (B2) 0.0221  
 (0.316)  
 [0.004]  
Acquisition (10%) - Professional CEO (B2)  0.370 
  (0.387) 
  [0.073] 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family CEO (B3) -0.761***  
 (0.208)  
 [-0.119]  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family CEO (B3)  -0.726*** 
  (0.206) 
  [-0.114] 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Professional CEO (B4) 0.338**  
 (0.136)  
 [0.064]  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Professional CEO (B4)  0.316** 
  (0.134) 
  [0.06] 
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family -0.428**  
 (0.189)  
 [-0.069]  
Acquisition (10%) - Non-family  -0.547** 
  (0.235) 
  [-0.085] 
Institutional ownership -0.134 -0.141 
 (0.471) (0.469) 
 [-0.024] [-0.025] 
Board size 0.00741 0.00833 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Board busyness -0.135 -0.143 
 (0.125) (0.125) 
 [-0.024] [-0.026] 
Board independence -0.127 -0.138 
 (0.293) (0.294) 
 [-0.023] [-0.025] 
CEO age -0.0495*** -0.0495*** 
 (0.00806) (0.00804) 
 [-0.009] [-0.009] 
Dual shares -0.156 -0.151 
 (0.138) (0.138) 
 [-0.028] [-0.027] 
Sales (log) 0.128*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0441) 
 [0.023] [0.023] 
Market-to-book -0.0275 -0.0246 
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 (0.0681) (0.0679) 
 [-0.005] [-0.004] 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -2.401*** -2.415*** 
 (0.618) (0.615) 
 [-0.432] [-0.435] 
Market-adjusted return -0.265** -0.258** 
 (0.121) (0.121) 
 [-0.048] [-0.046] 
Return standard deviation 0.122* 0.125* 
 (0.0683) (0.0685) 
 [0.022] [0.022] 
Constant -13.83*** -13.87*** 
 (1.287) (1.282) 
   
Observations 3,219 3,219 
p-value B1=B3 0.842 0.410 
p-value B2=B4 0.295 0.886 
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Table 8.  ATEs (Average Treatment Effects) of acquisitions using covariate matching 
This table reports the estimates of average treatments effects (ATEs) that are computed by using the bias-corrected 
nearest-neighbour matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). An observation is assumed to be 
treated when the Dummy acquisition is equal to one. We apply filters of 5% and 10% as the relative size 
requirements for our sample of acquisitions, i.e., the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s value is at least 5% 
(10%). We measure the acquirer’s value using the market value of total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
completion date. The outcome variables are CEO total compensation, CEO cash compensation, and CEO turnover. 
The matching variables are all of the control variables in the regression models, except for the dummy for family 
firms and year, country, and industry dummies. The ATEs are reported for one, two, and three matches. Variable 
definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
Panel A: Family firms 
1 match      
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) -0.005 0.146 -0.040 0.967 
Cash compensation (log) -0.049 0.128 -0.383 0.701 
CEO turnover -0.041 0.051 -0.804 0.421 
      
10% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.377 0.218 1.727 0.084 
Cash compensation (log) 0.310 0.197 1.575 0.115 
CEO turnover -0.118 0.061 -1.919 0.054 
      
3 matches     
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.009 0.136 0.067 0.946 
Cash compensation (log) -0.041 0.118 -0.347 0.728 
CEO turnover -0.052 0.046 -1.118 0.263 
      
10% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.388 0.210 1.842 0.065 
Cash compensation (log) 0.275 0.188 1.465 0.142 
CEO turnover -0.118 0.064 -1.843 0.065 
      
5 matches     
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.002 0.132 0.015 0.987 
Cash compensation (log) -0.056 0.115 -0.488 0.625 
CEO turnover -0.051 0.044 -1.150 0.250 
      
10% relative-size filter   Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.385 0.209 1.836 0.066 
Cash compensation (log) 0.273 0.186 1.465 0.142 
CEO turnover -0.121 0.066 -1.821 0.068 
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Panel B: Non-family firms 
1 match     
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.136 0.076 1.790 0.073 
Cash compensation (log) 0.110 0.062 1.757 0.078 
CEO turnover -0.085 0.030 -2.767 0.005 
     
10% relative-size filter Coefficient  Standard Error z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.219 0.094 2.314 0.020 
Cash compensation (log) 0.209 0.072 2.879 0.003 
CEO turnover -0.085 0.041 -2.093 0.036 
     
3 matches     
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.145 0.074 1.961 0.049 
Cash compensation (log) 0.116 0.061 1.905 0.056 
CEO turnover -0.095 0.028 -3.390 0.000 
     
10% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.238 0.092 2.577 0.009 
Cash compensation (log) 0.218 0.069 3.144 0.001 
CEO turnover -0.090 0.039 -2.298 0.021 
     
5 matches     
5% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error  z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.156 0.072 2.157 0.030 
Cash compensation (log) 0.123 0.060 2.048 0.040 
CEO turnover -0.091 0.028 -3.223 0.001 
     
10% relative-size filter Coefficient Standard Error z-stat p-value 
Total compensation (log) 0.235 0.092 2.556 0.010 
Cash compensation (log) 0.209 0.067 3.088 0.002 
CEO turnover -0.083 0.039 -2.107 0.035 
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Table 9:  CEM (Coarsened Exact Matching) estimation 
This table reports the estimates of the coarsened exact matching (CEM) regressions for CEO total compensation, 
CEO cash compensation, and CEO turnover. CEM estimation relies on strata that are based on quartiles of the 
following variables: Institutional ownership, Board busyness, Sales (log), Market-to-book, and Market-adjusted 
return. A reduced sample of 1,750 better-matched firm years is used in the regressions. All regressions include 
country, industry, and year fixed effects. The ownership and financial variables are lagged with respect to the 
dependent variable. Variable definitions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
     
 
Total compensation 
(log) 
Cash compensation 
(log) 
  CEO turnover 
 
        
Acquisition (5%) - Family (B1) -0.136 -0.117 -0.134 
 (0.101) (0.0922) (0.280) 
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family (B2) 0.172** 0.165** -0.484** 
 (0.0718) (0.0653) (0.207) 
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family (B3) -0.130** -0.0673 -0.233 
 (0.0588) (0.0534) (0.164) 
Institutional ownership 0.534*** 0.471*** -0.410 
 (0.185) (0.168) (0.505) 
Board size 0.0566*** 0.0454*** 0.0434** 
 (0.00680) (0.00618) (0.0181) 
Board busyness 0.324*** 0.178*** -0.260* 
 (0.0515) (0.0468) (0.145) 
Board independence 0.493*** 0.383*** 0.645** 
 (0.119) (0.108) (0.329) 
CEO age -0.00533* -0.000571 -0.0472*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00282) (0.00894) 
Dual shares 0.286*** 0.198*** -0.135 
 (0.0594) (0.0540) (0.165) 
Sales (log) 0.237*** 0.210*** 0.132** 
 (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0540) 
Market-to-book 0.175*** 0.120*** 0.143 
 (0.0387) (0.0352) (0.107) 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -0.0391 0.202 -3.308*** 
 (0.326) (0.296) (0.864) 
Market-adjusted return 0.147** 0.110** -0.119 
 (0.0606) (0.0551) (0.170) 
Return standard deviation 0.00851 0.0226 -0.0727 
 (0.0334) (0.0304) (0.0913) 
Constant 2.862*** 2.472*** -15.55 
 (0.640) (0.582) (424.6) 
    
Observations 1,750 1,750 1,750 
R-squared 0.542 0.500  
p-value B1=B3 0.954 0.591 0.725 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Classification of firm-year observations 
 Family firm Non-family firm 
Acquisition Acquisition – Family 
Acquisition – Family CEO 
Acquisition – Non-family 
Acquisition – Professional CEO 
Non-acquisition Non-acquisition – Family 
Non-acquisition – Family CEO 
Non-acquisition – Non-family 
Non-acquisition – Professional CEO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table A2: Variable definitions 
This table reports definitions for the dependent variables, acquisition, family, and CEO dummies, and other 
variables used in the study. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable Definition 
  
Total compensation CEO total compensation, which is the sum of cash compensation and 
equity-based compensation, in thousands of Euros. Equity-based 
compensation is equal to the value of shares and options granted 
during a year. For the value of options, BoardEx provides the 
estimated value of options awarded, which is a theoretical value used 
to calculate the potential value of the option during the vesting period 
by using the Black Sholes model. For the value of restricted stock, 
BoardEx reports the maximum value obtainable under the long-term 
incentive plan.   
  
Cash compensation CEO cash compensation, which is the sum of salary and bonuses in 
thousands of Euros. 
  
CEO turnover Binary variable that takes the value of one if the CEO leaves his/her 
firm during the year. 
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Panel B: Acquisition, family, and CEO dummies 
 
Variable Definition 
  
Dummy acquisition (5%) Binary variable that is equal to one for the year following an 
acquisition, with Relative deal size of at least 5%. In the case of 
multiple deals in the same year, we cumulate the values of the 
deals.  
  
Dummy acquisition (10%) Binary variable that is equal to one for the year following an 
acquisition, with Relative deal size of at least 10%. In the case of 
multiple deals in the same year, we cumulate the values of the 
deals. 
  
Family firm Binary variable that equals one when the firm is controlled by a 
family. 
 
  
Family CEO Binary variable that takes the value of one when a family member 
is the CEO in a family firm, and zero when the CEO is not a 
family member in a family firm. The variable is set to missing 
when Family firm equals zero. That is, this variable is not defined 
when the firm is not a family firm.  
  
Acquisition (5%) - Family  Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(5%) and Family firm take the value of one. 
  
Acquisition (10%) - Family Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(10%) and Family firm take the value of one. 
  
Acquisition (5%) - Family CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(5%) and Family CEO take the value of one. 
  
Acquisition (10%) - Family CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(10%) and Family CEO take the value of one. 
  
Acquisition (5%) - Professional CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition (5%) 
takes the value of one and Family CEO takes the value of zero. 
  
Acquisition (10%) - Professional CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition 
(10%) takes the value of one and Family CEO takes the value of 
zero. 
  
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition (5%) 
takes the value of zero and Family firm takes the value of one. 
  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition 
(10%) takes the value of zero and Family firm takes the value of 
one. 
  
Non-acquisition (5%) - Family CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition (5%) 
takes the value of zero and Family CEO takes the value of one. 
  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Family CEO Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition 
(10%) takes the value of zero and Family CEO takes the value of 
one. 
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Non-acquisition (5%) - Professional 
CEO 
Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(5%) and Family CEO take the value of zero. 
  
Non-acquisition (10%) - Professional 
CEO 
Binary variable that is equal to one when both Dummy acquisition 
(10%) and Family CEO take the value of zero. 
  
Acquisition (5%) - Non-family Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition (5%) 
takes the value of one and Family firm takes the value of zero. 
  
Acquisition (10%) - Non-family Binary variable that is equal to one when Dummy acquisition 
(10%) takes the value of one and Family firm takes the value of 
zero. 
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Panel C: Other variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Board busyness A dummy variable that equals one if the board is defined as busy, which 
occurs when 50% or more of the board’s outside directors hold three or 
more directorships in other quoted companies.  
  
Board independence The ratio of independent non-executive directors to Board size.   
  
Board size Board size is the total number of executive and non-executive directors. 
  
CAR(-1,+1) Cumulative abnormal return for the deal announcement date calculated by 
using the market model over the event window (-1, +1). In the case of 
multiple deals in the same year, we use a value-weighted average. 
  
CAR(-2,+2) Cumulative abnormal return for the deal announcement date calculated by 
using the market model over the event window (-2, +2). In case of multiple 
deals in the same year, we use a value-weighted average. 
  
CEO age The age of the CEO. 
  
Days to completion Total number of days between announcement and deal completion dates. 
In the case of multiple deals in the same year, we use a value-weighted 
average. 
  
Deal size The value of the deal in millions of Euros. In the case of multiple deals in 
the same year, we cumulate the values of the deals. 
  
Domestic deal A dummy that equals one if the bidder and target are from the same 
country. In the case of multiple deals in the same year, we use a value-
weighted average. 
  
Dual shares A binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a dual-class 
equity structure.   
  
Focused deal A dummy that is set to one if the bidder and target are from the same 
industry. In the case of multiple deals in the same year, we use a value-
weighted average. 
  
Industry-adjusted return on 
assets 
The industry-adjusted ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets.  
  
Institutional ownership Total percentage of shares held by financial institutions. 
  
Market-adjusted return The annual stock return adjusted by the local market return. 
  
Market-to-book The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
  
Public deal A dummy that equals one if the target is a listed firm. In the case of 
multiple deals in the same year, we use a value-weighted average. 
  
Relative deal size The ratio of Deal size to the market value of assets of the bidder. In the 
case of multiple deals in the same year, we cumulate the values of the 
deals. 
  
Return standard deviation The annual standard deviation of daily stock returns.  
  
Sales Net sales in millions of Euros. 
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Sales (log) Natural logarithm of net sales in thousands of Euros. 
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Table A3: Sample distribution across Continental European countries 
Country Number of firm-years Number of unique firms 
Austria 19 4 
Belgium 129 43 
Denmark 21 5 
Finland 38 10 
France 1,119 224 
Germany 384 111 
Greece 8 4 
Italy 279 68 
Netherlands 427 83 
Norway 82 29 
Portugal 12 5 
Spain 97 27 
Sweden 499 107 
Switzerland 104 39 
Luxembourg 1 1 
   
Total 3,219 760 
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Table A4. Firm characteristics (10% of relative-size filter for acquisitions) 
This table reports the mean and median values of firm characteristics. We apply a filter of 10% as a relative size requirement for our sample of acquisitions, i.e., the ratio of the 
deal value to the acquirer’s value is at least 10%. The acquirer’s value is measured by the market value of total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the completion date. Variable 
definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. We test differences in the means (medians) between non-acquiring and acquiring firms using t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests). The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Sample (N=3,219) Family Firms  (N=1,247) Non-Family Firms  (N=1,972) 
 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=2,413) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=806) 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=1,106) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=231) 
Non-Acquiring Firms 
(N=1,397) 
Acquiring Firms 
(N=575) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Family firm 0.421 0.000 0.287*** 0.000***         
Family CEO 0.187 0.000 0.132*** 0.000*** 0.445 0.000 0.459 0.000     
Institutional ownership 0.176 0.142 0.220*** 0.197*** 0.131 0.108 0.151*** 0.136*** 0.208 0.187 0.247*** 0.219*** 
Board size 11.206 10.000 11.596** 11.000*** 10.433 10.000 10.455 10.000 11.768 11.000 12.054 12.000*** 
Board busyness 0.343 0.000 0.469*** 0.000*** 0.347 0.000 0.429** 0.000** 0.340 0.000 0.485*** 0.000*** 
Board independence 0.218 0.182 0.275*** 0.250*** 0.182 0.154 0.245*** 0.250*** 0.244 0.214 0.286*** 0.250*** 
CEO age 53.303 53.000 53.231 53.000 53.593 53.000 52.303** 51.000*** 53.092 53.000 53.603 54.000* 
Dual shares 0.246 0.000 0.278* 0.000* 0.297 0.000 0.325 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.259** 0.000** 
Sales 5,444.9 1,015.2 7,230.2*** 1,546.7*** 4,494.1 9,084.4 1,990.0*** 763.8** 6,136.5 1,138.7 9,335.4*** 2,375.5*** 
Market-to-book 1.788 1.438 1.516*** 1.337*** 1.790 1.452 1.553*** 1.422 1.787 1.436 1.501*** 1.300*** 
Industry-adjusted 
return on assets 0.008 0.007 -0.010*** -0.006*** 
0.018 0.011 0.005** 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.017*** -0.010*** 
Market-adjusted return 0.064 0.008 0.088 0.018 0.070 0.008 0.091 0.021 0.060 0.008 0.086 0.016 
Return standard  
deviation 
2.151 1.891 2.108 1.855 2.031 1.832 2.074 1.807 2.239 1.962 2.121** 1.880** 
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Table A5: CEO total, cash compensation, and turnover (10% of the relative-size filter for acquisitions) 
This table reports the mean and median values of the dependent variables. We apply a filter of 10% as a relative 
size requirement for our sample of acquisitions, i.e., the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s value is at least 
10%. We measure the acquirer’s value using the market value of total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
completion date. Variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. We test the differences in means 
(medians) between non-acquiring and acquiring firms using t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 All Sample (N=3,219) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=2,413) Acquiring Firms (N=806) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,329.980 684.834 1,795.643*** 890.505*** 
Cash compensation 914.555 602.279 1,084.209*** 732.917*** 
CEO turnover 0.263 0 0.267 0 
 Family Firms (N=1,247) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=1,016) Acquiring Firms (N=231) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,302.722 615.850 1,254.286 543.573 
Cash compensation 913.324 555.350 853.811 472.610 
CEO turnover 0.247 0 0.268 0 
 Non-Family Firms (N=1,972) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=1397) Acquiring Firms (N=575) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,349.805 742.100 2,013.127*** 1,167.867*** 
Cash compensation 915.451 624.848 1,176.770*** 848.498*** 
CEO turnover 0.276 0 0.266 0 
 Family CEO (N=558) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=452) Acquiring Firms (N=106) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,086.653 420.200 937.069 396.574 
Cash compensation 814.297 414.777 695.940 351.625 
CEO turnover 0.146 0 0.189 0 
 Professional CEO (N=689) 
 Non-Acquiring Firms (N=564) Acquiring Firms (N=125) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Total compensation 1,475.883 779.947 1,523.287 754.826 
Cash compensation 992.686 678.944 987.685 663.662 
CEO turnover 0.328 0 0.336 0 
 
 
 
 
 
